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We are celebrating Chief Judge Randall Rader’s service to the
federal court over the past 20 years. His opinions reflect his
exceptional background in patent law, experience in the trial and
appellate courts, participation in the legislative branch, dedication
to teaching, breadth of international scholarship, and thoughtful
writing. Therefore, it is fitting that we gain special insight into his
opinions and reflect on his over 20 years as a Federal Circuit
judge.
Chief Judge Rader’s stellar educational and academic
background makes him highly qualified for his work on the
Federal Circuit and as Chief Judge. It is no surprise that Chief
Judge Rader is an excellent writer. He graduated magna cum laude
from Brigham Young University with a degree in English and
received his J.D. with honors from George Washington University
Law Center in 1978. He maintains an academic connection on the
court by serving as a professor of patent law at the George
Washington University Law School, Georgetown University Law
Center, the University of Virginia School of Law, and other
university programs in Tokyo, Taipei, New Delhi, and Beijing. His
passion for teaching and excellence in the law has earned him
numerous awards.
In addition, Chief Judge Rader’s academic scholarship includes
*
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two books on patent law, a leading textbook on U.S. patent law
titled Cases and Materials on Patent Law, 1 and Patent Law in a
Nutshell, 2 both co-authored with one of my law school professors,
Martin Adelman. It is through Professor Adelman’s great teaching
that I started on my legal career, and it is at his suggestion that I
speak about Chief Judge Rader’s opinions concerning the use of
experts in intellectual property cases.
Beyond his academic excellence, Chief Judge Rader has
extensive experience on the Hill. He served as counsel in the
House for members serving on the Appropriations, Interior, and
Ways and Means Committees, and, in the Senate, was Chief
Counsel to Subcommittees for the Senate Judiciary Committee.
This experience serves him well on the court, and his opinions
reflect his statutory deference. To quote Chief Judge Rader’s own
words in his Bilski dissent, “When all else fails, consult the
statute.”3
Prior to serving on the Federal Circuit, Chief Judge Rader was
appointed by President Reagan in 1988 to the United States Claims
Court, now the U.S. Court of Federal Claims. After his nomination
for the Federal Circuit by President George H.W. Bush, he started
with the court in August 1990. He became Chief Judge on June 1,
2010, and is setting his mark as the leader of that court.
As a trial judge, I will focus on a familiar topic—the use of
experts—and leave the remaining speakers to comment on Chief
Judge Rader’s other contributions to patent law. I will highlight
Chief Judge Rader’s discussion of the use of expert testimony in
three areas: use of an expert in claim construction, use of a courtappointed expert for technical assistance, and limits on an expert’s
opinions through the trial court’s role as a gatekeeper.
I begin with one of Chief Judge Rader’s earlier opinions while
sitting as a trial judge, Loral Fairchild Corp. v. Victor Co. of
Japan, Ltd.4 Looking back to the early years of Chief Judge
Rader’s career on the Federal Circuit, there was nothing called a
1

MARTIN ADELMAN ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS IN PATENT LAW (2d
ed. 2003).
2
MARTIN J. ADELMAN ET AL., PATENT LAW IN A NUTSHELL (2007).
3
In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943, 1015 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (Rader, J., dissenting).
4
906 F. Supp. 798 (E.D.N.Y. 1995).
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Markman hearing until 1995, when the Federal Circuit decided
Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc. 5 Afterwards, Chief Judge
Rader was one of the first judges to use an expert in a Markman
claim construction hearing. Sitting as a trial judge in Loral, Chief
Judge Rader held a two-day bench hearing in August of 1995 on
the meaning of the claims with experts from each side. The claims
involved an improvement of semiconductor devices. The parties,
not surprisingly, disputed certain claim terms. Chief Judge Rader
provided that “[t]he extensive briefing convinced this court of the
need for expert testimony to enlighten the meaning of claim terms
to one of ordinary skill in the art at the time of invention.” 6 As a
result, the court heard expert testimony on the meaning of the
claim terms. Chief Judge Rader explained:
Extrinsic evidence may demonstrate the state of the
art at the time of the invention and thus assist the
court in the construction of the patent claims. The
extrinsic evidence provides assistance to the court
in understanding how someone skilled in the art at
the time of the invention would understand the
claims. 7
Following the Supreme Court’s decision in Markman v.
Westview Instruments, Inc., 8 the views of the Federal Circuit
judges on when and how extrinsic evidence could be considered in
claim construction shifted for some years from Chief Judge
Rader’s favored use of experts in Loral, to disfavored by the panel
in Vitronics Corp. v. Conceptronic, Inc., 9 to permissible for
dictionaries in Texas Digital Systems, Inc. v. Telegenix, Inc.,10 until
the en banc Federal Circuit decision in Phillips v. AWH Corp. 11
reaffirmed that extrinsic evidence may be useful to confirm what a
person having ordinary skill in the art would have understood at
5

52 F.3d 967 (Fed. Cir. 1995).
Loral, 906 F. Supp. at 802.
7
Id. at 803 (citing Markman, 52 F.3d at 980-81) (citation omitted).
8
517 U.S. 370 (1996).
9
90 F.3d 1576 (Fed. Cir. 1996).
10
308 F.3d 1193 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
11
415 F.3d 1303 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
6
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the time of the invention—exactly Chief Judge Rader’s use in
Loral—while stating that intrinsic evidence is of paramount
importance and the starting point of the claim construction
analysis. 12
Chief Judge Rader’s early use of experts in a Markman hearing
is consistent with the reported claim construction practice of a
majority of federal judges. In a 2008 survey of claim construction
by the Federal Judicial Center, 65 percent of federal judges
reported that they considered expert testimony or a report from a
science or technology expert as extrinsic evidence as a part of the
Markman process. 13 This widespread use of experts in claim
construction adds to the debate of whether claim construction is
purely a question of law with the resulting and current de novo
review, the conclusion of Cybor Corp. v. FAS Technologies, Inc.,14
or whether claim construction may involve underlying questions of
fact, as reflected by Chief Judge Rader’s dissent from a denial of a
petition for rehearing en banc in Amgen Inc. v. Hoechst Marion
Roussel, Inc. 15 He wrote, “I urge this court to accord deference to
the factual components of the lower court’s claim construction.” 16
The panelists may, during the conference, give their views on
whether Chief Judge Rader’s dissent is likely to gain traction.
What conclusions do we reach concerning Chief Judge Rader’s
use of an expert in claim construction? First, he practices what he
preaches by his willingness to serve on the district court. Second,
he recognizes that trial judges may need to understand how
someone skilled in the art at the time of the invention would
understand the claims. Third, he recognizes the possibility that the
Federal Circuit might review whether trial courts should be
afforded deference in some cases for factual findings in claim
construction.
Beyond claim construction, the second area I will address is
12

Id. at 1319.
REBECCA N. EYRE ET AL., PATENT CLAIM CONSTRUCTION: A SURVEY OF
FEDERAL DISTRICT JUDGES 20 (2008), available at http://www.fjc.gov/public/
pdf.nsf/lookup/patclaim.pdf/$file/patclaim.pdf.
14
138 F.3d 1448 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
15
469 F.3d 1039, 1044 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (Rader, J., dissenting).
16
Id.
13
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Chief Judge Rader’s opinion concerning the appointment of the
court’s own technical experts. The technical complexity of many
patent claims may lead trial judges to seek the assistance of courtappointed experts, special masters, or technical advisors for
assistance in the case.
Chief Judge Rader, in Monolithic Power Systems, Inc. v. O2
Micro International Ltd.,17 affirmed the trial court’s decision to
appoint its own technical expert. This was an unusually complex
case with starkly conflicting expert testimony by the parties’ own
experts. Citing to Federal Rule of Evidence 706(a), which permits
a court to appoint an expert either “on its own motion or on the
motion of any party to assist the trial court,” Chief Judge Rader
pointed out that the commentators emphasized that district courts
rarely exercised their authority to make such appointments. 18 After
a full review of the record, Chief Judge Rader perceived no abuse
of discretion under the regional law that permitted wide latitude in
such appointments. He acknowledged that “[t]he predicaments
inherent in court appointment of an independent expert and
revelations to the jury about the expert’s neutral status trouble this
court to some extent” but also noted the trial court’s careful
admonitions to the jury concerning use of a court-appointed
technical expert.19 In Monolithic Power, Chief Judge Rader
thoughtfully pointed out the potential dangers of an independent
expert, carefully evaluated the trial court’s record, and provided
guidance to the bench and the bar about a cautious, yet deferential
approach to court-appointed technical experts.
The final area involving experts I will highlight is Chief Judge
Rader’s consistent reference to the role of the trial court as a
gatekeeper under Daubert and Evidence Rule 702 to ensure that
scientific, economic, or opinion evidence presented by an expert
has a sound foundation before presentation to a judge or jury.
Interestingly, the Daubert case originated in my district before the
judge who had his chambers next to mine, the first AfricanAmerican judge in San Diego County, the beloved Earl Gilliam.
When counsel put a French pronunciation to the Daubert case, I
17

558 F.3d 1341 (Fed. Cir. 2009).
Id. at 1346-47.
19
Id. at 1348.
18
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smile and quietly reflect on the fact that to Judge Gilliam, it was
simply Daubert. The principle was that an expert needed to have a
sufficient scientific foundation before offering an opinion on
scientific evidence to the jury. In that case, the issue was medical
causation of a birth defect. 20
Chief Judge Rader provides district judges with a clear path to
follow for the admission of expert testimony when evaluating the
economic analysis to support patent damages. Recently, in IP
Innovation L.L.C. v. Red Hat, Inc., 21 Chief Judge Rader applied the
relevant standards and granted a motion to strike the testimony and
expert report as inadmissible to establish reasonable royalty
damages, but permitted the parties to remedy the deficiencies in
the expert’s analysis. Chief Judge Rader started out his analysis
with the Daubert principle that the district courts act as
gatekeepers tasked with the inquiry into whether expert testimony
is not only relevant, but reliable. 22 He then noted that a reasonable
royalty contemplates a hypothetical negotiation between the
patentee and the infringer at a time before the infringement began
under the Georgia-Pacific Corp. v U.S. Plywood Corp. factors. 23
Although some approximation is permitted, the Federal Circuit
requires sound economic and factual predicates for that analysis. 24
Where sound economic and factual predicates are absent from a
reasonable royalty analysis, Rule 702 requires a court to exclude
the unreliable proffered evidence, either before trial on a motion to
the court, as Chief Judge Rader did in IP Innovation, or on a posttrial motion as occurred in Cornell University v. Hewlett-Packard
Co. 25
Chief Judge Rader has been careful to require sound
foundations for expert opinions at all stages of the litigation. For
example, he reviewed the sufficiency of an expert’s opinion at
20

Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
705 F. Supp. 2d 687 (E.D. Tex. 2010).
22
Id. at 689 (citing Daubert, 509 U.S. at 589).
23
Id. at 691 (citing Georgia-Pacific Corp. v. U.S. Plywood Corp., 318 F.
Supp. 1116 (S.D.N.Y. 1970)).
24
Riles v. Shell Exploration & Prod. Co., 298 F.3d 1302, 1311 (Fed. Cir.
2002).
25
609 F. Supp. 2d 279 (N.D.N.Y. 2009).
21
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summary judgment in Intellectual Science & Technology, Inc. v.
Sony Electronics, Inc.26 Applying the standard of regional circuit
law of the Sixth Circuit that was similar to the Federal Circuit’s
standard in Arthur A. Collins, Inc. v. Northern Telecom Ltd.,27 he
concluded that an expert opinion submitted in the context of a
summary judgment motion must set forth facts and, in doing so,
outline a line of reasoning arising from a logical foundation. 28 An
expert’s unsupported conclusion on the ultimate issue of
infringement will not alone create a genuine issue of material fact.
Moreover, a party may not avoid that rule by simply framing the
expert’s conclusion as an assertion that a particular critical claim
limitation is found in the accused device. 29
When expert methodology is sound, and the evidence relied
upon is sufficiently related to the case at hand, disputes about the
degree of relevance or accuracy may go to the testimony’s weight,
but not its admissibility. As cited in the per curiam opinion in
ResQnet.com, Inc. v. Lansa, Inc., where Chief Judge Rader was
one of the panel judges, “‘[d]etermining a fair and reasonable
royalty is often . . . a difficult judicial chore, seeming often to
involve more the talents of a conjurer than those of a judge.’” 30
The hypothetical negotiation “necessarily involves an element of
approximation and uncertainty.” 31 But a damages calculation must
not be speculative.
When the expert uses speculative damages, Chief Judge Rader
has been careful to explain why such speculative testimony should
be disregarded. In Cornell, an expert used inflated damages
calculations without tying those numbers to the permissible
economic standards. Chief Judge Rader acknowledged that with
proper proof, a party may invoke the entire market value rule to
include within the royalty base both infringing and non-infringing
26

589 F.3d 1179 (Fed. Cir. 2009).
216 F.3d 1042 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
28
Intellectual Sci. & Tech., Inc., 589 F.3d at 1183-84.
29
Id. at 1184.
30
594 F.3d 860, 869 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (quoting Fromson v. W. Litho Plate &
Supply Co., 853 F.2d 1568, 1574 (Fed. Cir. 1988)).
31
Id. at 881 (quoting Lucent Techs., Inc. v. Gateway, Inc. 580 F.3d 1301,
1325 (Fed. Cir. 2009)).
27
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elements where the smaller component is the basis for consumer
demand of the larger product. Chief Judge Rader emphasized that
plaintiff “did not heed this court’s warning” that any royalty base
proffer must account for the fact that the infringing processor
covered by the patent at issue is a small component of a larger
server and workstation. 32 He concluded that no reasonable jury
could have relied on the inflated royalty base in determining
Cornell’s damages award.
Recent Federal Circuit cases where Chief Judge Rader served
on the panel, such as Uniloc USA, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp. 33 and
ResQnet, 34 have required sound economic principles for patent
damages awards. Interestingly, Chief Judge Rader noted in a recent
interview when he took over as Chief Judge that earlier cases such
as Rite-Hite Corp. v. Kelley Co., Inc.;35 Grain Processing Corp. v.
American Maize-Products Co.; 36 Riles v. Shell Exploration &
Production Co.; 37 and Crystal Semiconductor Corp. v. Tritech
Microelectronics International, Inc. 38 already stated that sound
economic principles must be present before the court would allow
a jury finding of damages to stand. For example, in Grain
Processing, the court stated, “To prevent the hypothetical from
lapsing into pure speculation, this court requires sound economic
proof of the nature of the market and likely outcomes with
infringement factored out of the economic picture.” 39
In sum, Chief Judge Rader’s writings on the subject of the use
of experts demonstrate his expertise and wisdom on the Federal
Circuit. Chief Judge Rader has consistently advocated that the trial
court’s duty is to be a gatekeeper to ensure that sound economic
principles are used to avoid presenting junk science to a jury. He
carefully assessed the use of technical experts and provided
practical guidance for the cautious use of experts with proper
32

Cornell Univ. v. Hewlett-Packard Co., 609 F. Supp. 2d 279, 287
(N.D.N.Y. 2009).
33
632 F.3d 1292 (Fed. Cir. 2011).
34
594 F.3d 860 (Fed. Cir. 2010).
35
56 F.3d 1538 (Fed. Cir. 1995).
36
185 F.3d 1341 (Fed. Cir. 1999).
37
298 F.3d 1302 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
38
246 F.3d 1336 (Fed. Cir. 2001).
39
Grain Processing, 185 F.3d at 1350.
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instructions to the jury. His experience at the district court and the
Federal Circuit opinions have offered helpful advice for trial
judges to assess what expert testimony is admissible and what
testimony should be excluded.
As a trial judge, I commend Chief Judge Rader for his
willingness to serve as a district judge. Not only does it provide
help to the districts, but the circuit judges better understand the
issues that may arise in the trial court setting. I also admire Chief
Judge Rader’s good nature and sense of humor. In an interview
conducted last year, Chief Judge Rader laughingly noted that he
might be reversed, like any other trial judge with a case on appeal
to the Federal Circuit. Applying sound statistical principles to an
analysis of potential reversal rates, I can safely predict that it is far
more likely that I would be reversed by the Federal Circuit than
Chief Judge Rader. In conclusion, the bench and bar are fortunate
to have Chief Judge Rader as a leader in the law and as Chief
Judge of the Federal Circuit. We all wish him many more years on
the bench, and we look forward to learning from him in the future.
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